| Conventional geopolitical thinking has long assumed | | | | by North Korea. At the same time, as U.S. forces |
| that North Korea has pursued an unrelenting | | | | would not be impacted by possible hostilities and |
| campaign of provocations, its illicit nuclear | | | | there no longer would be a binding U.S. |
| program, and even a nuclear weapons test with | | | | commitment to defend South Korea, the U.S. |
| the objective of assuring the survival of its | | | | would have far less legal basis to come to South |
| current regime. Toward that end, an exasperated | | | | Korea's assistance. Moreover, a bilateral |
| Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently told | | | | non-aggression agreement would make such |
| CNN, "there is no intention to invade or attack | | | | intervention illegal. This reality would greatly bolster |
| them. So they have that guarantee... I don't know | | | | North Korea's diplomatic leverage. |
| what more they want." It is that "more" that | | | | At present, North Korea's leadership has |
| North Korea wants that is really driving North | | | | concluded that events in the Middle East, South |
| Korea's actions. North Korea wants the U.S. to | | | | Asia, and East Africa have increased its |
| withdraw its forces from South Korea, end its | | | | opportunity to transform the geopolitical playing |
| military obligations to the South, and ultimately, | | | | field in its favor, with or without the support of |
| Korean reunification on its terms. | | | | the international community. In 2003, Joseph Nye, |
| North Korea has long sought to reunify and place | | | | Dean of Harvard University's Kennedy School of |
| the Korean Peninsula under its totalitarian rule. On | | | | Government trumpeted, "If anyone doubted the |
| June 25, 1950 it launched an invasion of South | | | | overwhelming nature of U.S. military power, Iraq |
| Korea only to have its forces rolled back by | | | | settled the issue... Not since Rome has one nation |
| massive U.S. intervention. Ultimately, following | | | | loomed so large above the others." Three years |
| Chinese, and to a lesser extent, Soviet | | | | later, North Korea sees only weakness. U.S. |
| intervention in the conflict, the boundary between | | | | forces in Iraq appear hapless in the face of a |
| the two Koreas was set at the 38th Parallel. | | | | 50,000-man insurgency, the Taliban is waging a |
| Since then, North Korea has persisted in its call | | | | comeback in Afghanistan, and radical Islamists |
| for reunification. Under Kim Jong-il, that call for | | | | affiliated with Al Qaeda have "bagged" Somalia |
| reunification has grown more urgent. North Korea | | | | with no U.S. response whatsoever. Furthermore, |
| sees Korean reunification as "the call of history," | | | | North Korea sees the United States as "isolated" |
| North Korea's Korean Central News Agency | | | | in the world community. In contrast, North Korea |
| (KCNA) explained on January 11, 1999. "For the | | | | believes it enjoys world support. "Kim Jong-il has |
| Korean nation, nothing is more important than | | | | dedicated himself to the human cause of |
| national reunification and no task is more urgent | | | | independence for a long time," KCNA declared, |
| than it," KCNA added. On October 4, 2006, KCNA | | | | "The [world's] progressive people repose absolute |
| declared, "To achieve the reunification of the | | | | trust in him." |
| country is the most urgent task facing the | | | | At a time when it is unimpressed with U.S. military |
| Korean nation." | | | | capabilities and sees only U.S. weakness, North |
| Kim Jong-il and his government believe they are | | | | Korea believes it is invincible. On October 10, |
| the ones who will bring about Korean reunification. | | | | KCNA boasted, "The single-minded unity of the |
| On August 5, 2002, KCNA reported, "National | | | | DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] in |
| reunification is sure to come under the leadership | | | | the Songun [strong military-centered state] era |
| of Kim Jong-il, the sun of the 21st century and | | | | represents an indestructible harmonious whole in |
| the lodestar of national reunification." | | | | which the army and the people are closely united... |
| When discussing its pursuit of reunification, North | | | | It is growing ever stronger... The single-minded |
| Korea employs often soothing language. On | | | | unity of our party and army is unbreakable." The |
| January 7, 1999 KCNA explained, "To achieve the | | | | news agency also proclaimed, "Our party will |
| great unity of the whole nation is a decisive | | | | always demonstrate its might as an indestructible |
| guarantee for the independent and peaceful | | | | party that remains unshaken in any storm and |
| reunification of the fatherland." | | | | stress and a militant party capable of doing |
| There is nothing reassuring about North Korea's | | | | anything..." |
| calls for reunification. Rather, North Korea is | | | | If North Korea largely escapes vigorous sanctions |
| borrowing from Cold War Era propaganda efforts | | | | on account of its nuclear test, and odds favor |
| that were aimed at dividing Western popular | | | | such an outcome, North Korea's perception that it |
| opinion. For example, a declassified memorandum | | | | is in a position of being "capable of doing anything" |
| to the director of the CIA issued on December | | | | will only be bolstered. That will likely lead to an |
| 21, 1961 observed of the USSR, "The peaceful | | | | even more defiant and provocative North Korea. |
| coexistence line, far from being an abandonment | | | | Given international events and its own balance of |
| of Soviet expansionist goals, is a tactical | | | | powers calculations, North Korea is now stepping |
| prescription considerably more effective than the | | | | up its campaign to eliminate the presence of U.S. |
| compound of heavy-handedness and isolationism | | | | forces on the Korean Peninsula. That is the real |
| which was Stalin's foreign policy." | | | | story behind its recent nuclear test. "The Koreans |
| At closer inspection, the fangs of North Korea's | | | | should force the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces, |
| totalitarian dictatorship are barely concealed. | | | | the very source of war, to quit South Korea as |
| "South Korea should not depend on the outside | | | | early as possible," North Korean newspaper |
| forces, but take the way for reunification through | | | | Rodong Sinmun recently declared. "The U.S. forces |
| alliance with communism and the north," KCNA | | | | present in South Korea are a stumbling block lying |
| advised on January 4, 1999. An "alliance with | | | | in the way of...solving the issue of the country's |
| communism" would mean that South Korea would | | | | reunification independently by the concerted |
| be required to embrace North Korea's totalitarian | | | | efforts of the Koreans," KCNA stated on October |
| system. The January 7, 1999 KCNA report added, | | | | 4. KCNA also asserted, "The U.S. policy of military |
| "The five-point policy as well as the 10-Point | | | | occupation of South Korea is a policy of |
| Program of the Great Unity of the Whole Nation | | | | enslavement to all intents and purposes. The U.S. |
| put forward by President Kim Il Sung are the | | | | has interfered in all internal affairs of South Korea |
| banner the entire nation should uphold and the | | | | ranging from the installing of the 'government' to |
| political program of great unity they must | | | | shaping its policies and their implementation to |
| invariably defend and realize without fail." Later, on | | | | serve its purpose of aggression... It is the |
| March 8, 2003, KCNA predicted, "All the Koreans | | | | unanimous will and ardent desire of the Koreans |
| in the north, the south and abroad will work hard | | | | to drive the U.S. imperialist aggressor forces out |
| to accomplish the cause of national reunification | | | | of South Korea..." |
| under Kim Jong-il's steermanship and thus glorify | | | | So long as North Korea's paramount objective |
| [the] dignity and honor of Kim Il Sung's nation." | | | | remains Korean reunification on its terms, it |
| What is most revealing in this statement is that | | | | continues to view the U.S. commitment to South |
| North Korea, not South Korea, would be "glorified" | | | | Korea as thwarting that ambition, and it believes |
| by reunification. | | | | the U.S. is weakening--a failure for the U.S. to |
| At present, it is the collision of this North Korean | | | | bring about a stiff international sanctions regime |
| ambition and the U.S.-South Korean alliance that is | | | | will further confirm the idea that the U.S. is |
| driving North Korea's foreign policy in stiff defiance | | | | weakening--North Korea is not likely to alter its |
| of the will of the United Nations and North Korea's | | | | present course. Economic inducements or security |
| neighbors. North Korea is seeking to transform | | | | guarantees that fail to address North Korea's |
| the environment to the point where it possesses | | | | basic aspirations will hold little sway. North Korea |
| the leverage to bring an end to the Korean | | | | only wants an arrangement that would lead to the |
| Armistice Agreement of 1953 and can negotiate | | | | withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea and |
| reunification to its own terms. | | | | an end to the U.S.-South Korean military alliance. |
| In place of the existing Armistice Agreement, | | | | Anything else will do little to change North Korea's |
| North Korea seeks a "non-aggression pact" that | | | | behavior. As a result, there is little likelihood of |
| would mandate the withdrawal of U.S. forces | | | | meaningful breakthroughs anytime soon. Instead, |
| from South Korea and terminate the U.S.-South | | | | North Korea will likely continue its nuclear buildup, |
| Korea military pact. Then, South Korea would be | | | | carry out additional missile and nuclear tests, and |
| rendered far more vulnerable to a possible attack | | | | launch fresh provocations. |