| p>Across the board, U.S. foreign policy is achieving | | | | In contrast, under Neoconservatism, the use of |
| highly consistent outcomes--consistently bad ones. | | | | force is seen as an instrument for shaping a new |
| Those outcomes are either damaging critical U.S. | | | | world. Hence, preemptive military action is viewed |
| interests or making it more difficult for the United | | | | by Neoconservatives as legitimate for purposes |
| States to safeguard or promote such interests. In | | | | of "regime change" toward that end. |
| Iraq, the government is tilting increasingly to Iran | | | | Neoconservatism differs only from Wilsonian |
| while American armed forces are constant attack | | | | idealism in that it sees military force as the major |
| in struggle of attrition, Iran is defiantly pushing | | | | arbiter of change while Wilsonian idealism views |
| ahead with its nuclear ambitions, North Korea is | | | | international institutions as the arbiters of change. |
| threatening to test a nuclear device, the Taliban is | | | | Based on all the information that has arisen in the |
| making a comeback in Afghanistan, and Somalia | | | | wake of the Iraq war, the Iraq war would likely |
| has fallen into the hands of radical Islamists who | | | | fit the Neoconservative view of preemptive |
| have Al Qaeda ties. These unsatisfactory | | | | conflict. |
| outcomes are the direct result of a triumph of | | | | When a nation is a great power, Pragmatic |
| increasingly abstract theory over practice. | | | | Realism suggests that the power be viewed as a |
| Among the lessons that are clear is that | | | | precious resource to be used wisely. Hence, |
| Neoconservatism, like the earlier idealist | | | | Pragmatic Realism places importance on enduring |
| approaches that preceded it, has failed. Instead of | | | | relationships along the lines of common interests. |
| being anchored in history, it set its ideological | | | | Neoconservative idealism, because it grants |
| foundation in the mirage of Panglossian optimism. | | | | greater license to a use of force, seeks expedient |
| Instead of recognizing the importance of allies in a | | | | relationships e.g., temporary ad hoc coalitions, to |
| world constrained by a balance of powers, | | | | allow it to move ahead. The more liberal license |
| Neoconservatives chose a solo approach under | | | | for a use of force given by Neoconservative |
| the seductive illusion of a new "Unilateral Moment" | | | | idealism can lead to a number of adverse |
| that was supposed to have rendered the need | | | | consequences: a balancing of power by other |
| for allies obsolete. In short, Neoconservatism | | | | states against the great power that liberally uses |
| became increasingly detached both from history | | | | force if such states view that the force is not |
| and reality. Consequently, under the stewardship | | | | used for legitimate purposes, increases risks to |
| of a largely Neoconservative foreign policy team, | | | | their own interests, etc. As such, |
| U.S. foreign policy has crashed and is now burning | | | | Neoconservatism can give rise to global instability |
| in many parts of the world where U.S. interests | | | | while Pragmatic Realism can promote stability. |
| are greatest. | | | | Although idealism can work well in setting |
| It is time to return back to basics in foreign policy | | | | objectives, it falls short when it comes to |
| and diplomacy. Diplomacy is pursued to resolve | | | | accomplishing those ends. Compromise and |
| conflicts in interest to arrive settlements that | | | | conciliation are essential prerequisites to diplomacy. |
| secure or advance the core interests of all the | | | | Diplomatic bargaining requires a degree of flexibility |
| parties involved. Good solutions, rather than | | | | (again constrained by the "red lines"). Diplomatic |
| perfect ones, are the objective. In diplomacy, | | | | bargaining is not appeasement. The two should |
| compromise and conciliation are utilized to find or | | | | not be confused. Diplomatic bargaining creates |
| develop sufficient common ground so that the | | | | "win-win" situations where all parties obtain |
| parties' objectives are mutually-advanced, core | | | | benefits and core needs are not compromised. |
| needs are protected and, overall, the situation is | | | | Appeasement is an inequitable approach where |
| at least somewhat better than it would otherwise | | | | one party wins and the other loses. One makes |
| be. | | | | major concessions or takes unilateral steps while |
| Occasionally, the conflicting interests are | | | | receiving nothing in return with the hope that such |
| irreconcilable--sometimes by fact, other times by | | | | an exchange would resolve a given threat. Usually |
| rigidity among the parties themselves--and | | | | such exchanges only act as a catalyst for a |
| warfare results. However, barring extraordinary | | | | gathering threat, as they provide strong signals of |
| circumstances, war is typically viewed as a resort | | | | weakness and a lack of resolve. |
| to be pursued only after an exhaustive effort at | | | | In contrast to pragmatic approaches, wholly |
| diplomacy has failed and one's core needs are | | | | idealistic postures give rise to a proliferation of |
| endangered. | | | | irreconcilable positions. Such an approach increases |
| Overall, flexibility is a hallmark of pragmatism on | | | | the risk of conflict. The uncompromising nature of |
| which successful diplomacy rests. Such flexibility is | | | | idealistic positions precludes diplomacy, because |
| constrained by the core needs (as opposed to | | | | diplomacy entails flexibility that is at odds with the |
| desires) of the parties and those core needs | | | | idealistic posture of the parties in a dispute. |
| form the proverbial "red lines" which cannot be | | | | Consequently, a use of force becomes the only |
| crossed in any negotiated settlement. | | | | means left for resolving such a dispute and |
| Pragmatic Realism--Realpolitik with a dose of | | | | conflict erupts if any of the parties are sufficiently |
| idealism--is largely pragmatic in nature and it rests | | | | determined to pursue their idealistic objectives. |
| on calculations of national interest and power. It | | | | In the end, a more pragmatic approach tends to |
| incorporates a degree of idealism e.g., having a | | | | inform decision-making in business (negotiated |
| stable or free world as its end. Such an approach | | | | contracts) and governance (with respect to |
| is grounded in an understanding of human nature | | | | foreign and domestic policy). The reality that |
| as illustrated through the historical experience and | | | | resources are limited--limits of economic, military, |
| an underlying assumption that human nature | | | | political, and ideological power--promotes |
| changes very little over time (ongoing human | | | | pragmatism. Hence, what one refers to as "focus" |
| evolution might eventually change this, but such | | | | in a business setting takes precedence. Therefore, |
| change would lie in the very distant future). The | | | | with the exception of critical or vital interests, |
| lessons that have been learned--and | | | | most issues are viewed as amenable to |
| relearned--time and again are essentially that | | | | compromise by managers and political leaders. An |
| strength provides leverage, weakness invites | | | | uncompromising approach on most or all issues is |
| aggression, and appeasement magnifies threats to | | | | seen by most as unsustainable. As a result, |
| one's critical or vital interests. | | | | attempts to pursue such a strategy can only lead |
| Unlike under Neoconservative idealism, which also | | | | to a weakened ability to safeguard one's critical or |
| seeks a free world, the use of military force | | | | vital interests. |
| under Pragmatic Realism is more restrained. The | | | | With current U.S. foreign policy in bad shape and |
| issue of preemptive military action is a good case | | | | continuing to disintegrate, the "Neoconservative |
| in point. Under Pragmatic Realism, preemptive | | | | Moment" has passed. It is time for U.S. foreign |
| military action may be taken when there is | | | | policy to return to the Pragmatic Realism that |
| "unequivocal warning" of an imminent threat to | | | | served it so well throughout the Cold War Era. |
| one's critical or vital interests. When Intelligence is | | | | Only then will the U.S. be able to safeguard and |
| ambiguous or one's critical or vital interests are | | | | promote its critical international interests. Only |
| not at imminent risk, Pragmatic Realism rejects | | | | then will it have a meaningful chance to overcome |
| preemptive military action. | | | | the serious challenges to its national security. |