| | | | | nuclear program. |
| Introduction | | | | 2. Indian nuclear facilities that were only partially |
| The Cold War parameters of international relations | | | | safeguarded could not use American high |
| which had been based on the conflict of two | | | | technology. |
| alliance systems are undergoing radical shifts. In | | | | 3. Case-by-case agreements could be reached |
| the great chessboard of the 21st century new | | | | whereby dual-use technologies would be cleared |
| trends in the international arena are now | | | | for use in un-safeguarded and partially |
| influencing US Cold War policy preferences | | | | safeguarded facilities, if the use involved office |
| indicating new choices that will determine the | | | | administrative tasks and not nuclear material |
| direction of its relations in the new century. The | | | | directly. |
| changing nature of US relations with Japan, its | | | | The establishment of an army and navy |
| reconciliation efforts in the Korean peninsula, a | | | | Executive Steering Group in 1992, and the |
| growing, yet cautious opening up with China, and a | | | | airforce in 1993 led to the first ever military |
| constructive engagement with India clearly | | | | exercises on regular basis. By 1997, the two had |
| reflects a paradigm shift in the structure of many | | | | sponsored five joint exercise between the army, |
| of its ‘traditional’ Cold War relations in the | | | | airforce and navy In this regard three separate |
| efforts for a new strategic configuration. | | | | groups were established to foster more |
| In the scheme of American grand strategy for | | | | interaction and facilitate discussion: |
| the 'new world order’, India has emerged as | | | | - Defence Policy Group (DPG), for tackling issues |
| an attractive regional ally. With a population of | | | | of defence co-operation. The group also tackles |
| over a billion people, relatively stable political and | | | | sensitive issues like CTBT and Kashmir. |
| economic structures, and growing conventional | | | | - Joint Technical Group (JTG), for discussing issues |
| and nuclear power, India is seen in the White | | | | related to defence research. |
| House as a country which may prove to be a | | | | Joint Steering Committee (JSC), for discussing |
| useful partner in meeting challenges confronting | | | | personnel and information exchange, as well as |
| the United States' policies within South Asia and | | | | joint excercises. |
| the larger Asia-Pacific region. | | | | 2) Economic co-operation |
| In its efforts to bring India closer to US position, | | | | With the concept of ‘global village’ |
| the US Congress since 1993, has sought ‘new | | | | increasingly gaining credence, globalization of world |
| assistance categories reflecting modern | | | | economies is viewed as a phenomenon for |
| realities’ which would fulfil the requirements of | | | | speeding the process of accelerating economic, |
| the post-Cold War concerns. This approach has | | | | technological, cultural and political integration, and is |
| found the scales of US policy preferences tilting | | | | increasingly affecting events that had previously |
| considerably in favour of India despite a | | | | been seen in the larger context of superpower |
| commitment to follow an ‘even-handed’ | | | | military competition across the globe. Much of the |
| approach in relations with Pakistan and India. | | | | current US policy towards many regions of the |
| Consequently, the thrust of this growing | | | | world is focused on the opportunities offered by |
| relationship at the expense of valid regional | | | | the dynamics of global economy based on the |
| concerns of its once ‘most allied ally’ has | | | | notions of free market economics transforming |
| become increasingly evident. While India has been | | | | commerce, culture, communications and global |
| getting away with its nuclear programme and | | | | relations. Other problems that once seemed |
| worst kinds of abuses in the occupied state of | | | | distant, such as resource depletion, rapid |
| Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan has had to bear the | | | | population growth, environmental damage, new |
| brunt of not only economic and military sanctions, | | | | infectious diseases have increased US direct |
| but has been under tremendous pressure by the | | | | stakes in the prosperity and stability of other |
| United States to control religious extremists and | | | | nations in their support for international norms and |
| militant activities from its territory. | | | | human rights, their ability to combat international |
| The Indo-US dialogue following the nuclear tests | | | | crime, in their open markets, and their efforts to |
| of 1998, has led to the crafting of a multifaceted | | | | protect the environment. |
| partnership in the post-Cold War milieu between | | | | . The ‘global reach’ of the US has made it |
| the two ‘largest’ democracies. The 10th | | | | clear that the latter is interested in developing |
| round of Indo-US talks held in London in January | | | | transnational relations affected by the growing |
| 2000, discussed the possibility of institutionalising | | | | role of markets, industrialisation and the pace of |
| these bilateral consultations on a number of issues | | | | economic development. In this regard India is seen |
| regarding defence and security, economic relations | | | | as one of the ten largest emerging markets |
| and strategic co-operation, dialogue on nuclear | | | | which the US needs to tap in future. Ambassador |
| non-proliferation, and other issues of concern such | | | | Susan Esserman, deputy US trade representative |
| as drug trafficking, small arms and terrorism. | | | | speaking to the Federation of Indian Chambers of |
| These concerns of the new millennium have now | | | | Commerce and Industry in November 1999, |
| provided the material for a more broad-based, | | | | made it clear that “our administration supports |
| forward looking ties. | | | | a strong and prosperous India, which is a leader |
| The Vision document signed by President Clinton | | | | and full partner in the trading system”. |
| and Prime Minister Vajpayee during this sojourn | | | | In spite of co-operation both countries have their |
| “resolve(s) to create a closer and qualitatively | | | | share of disagreements on such issues as - |
| new relationship between the United States and | | | | unjustified quantitative restrictions, minimum |
| India” on the basis of “common interest in | | | | import prices on steel imports, investment rules in |
| and complementary responsibility for ensuring | | | | the auto industry, and access to Indian markets |
| regional and international security.” The | | | | for services and textiles. Nonetheless, following |
| document signed on March 21, 2000, declared that | | | | President Bush’s visit both countries have |
| India and the US were partners in providing | | | | pledged to reduce impediments to bilateral trade |
| “strategic stability in Asia and beyond. There | | | | and investment and to expand commerce, |
| can be little doubt that in the new US strategy | | | | specially in the emerging knowledge-based |
| towards South Asia, India seems to have been | | | | industries and high-technology areas such as |
| assigned a role despite the US nuclear | | | | information and computer software. |
| non-proliferation policy. Clinton’s visit failed to | | | | 3) Nuclear Co-operation |
| focus on the real issues of regional concern: the | | | | “Halting proliferation (of nuclear weapons) is |
| issue of Kashmir and the dangers of India’s | | | | not an option for us - it is an absolutely essential |
| growing nuclear programme. The President’s | | | | objective of our national security and a crucial |
| statements on the most vital issue - Kashmir - | | | | factor determining our country’s future. It is, |
| preventing peace in the region did not point to | | | | one might say America’s new Manifest |
| any specific US commitment to its solution; if | | | | Destiny” |
| anything, it was Pakistan who was warned against | | | | In 1974, six years after the signing of the NPT, |
| drawing borders with blood. | | | | India with its ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ |
| Moreover, seen in the context of the Vision | | | | (PNE), became the second Asian country and the |
| Statement of “working together to prevent | | | | sixth in the world to demonstrate such a |
| proliferation”, and the Indian declaration of its | | | | capability in spite of the US State Department |
| nuclear doctrine in August 1999, the US failed to | | | | warning (under the Nixon administration) in 1970, |
| engage India in any meaningful discussion on | | | | that “the US would consider it incompatible |
| nuclear disarmament. India and Untied States | | | | with existing US-Indian agreements for American |
| represent a fifth of the world’s people, and | | | | nuclear assistance to be employed in the |
| more than a quarter of the world’s economy. | | | | development of peaceful nuclear explosive |
| Both have built creative, entrepreneurial societies, | | | | devices”.However, a month after the Indian |
| and both are leaders in the information age, and in | | | | PNE, the US agreed to reschedule India’s |
| many ways, the character of the 21st century | | | | foreign debt and increase economic assistance to |
| world will depend on the success of (their) | | | | India in cooperation with other allies by about |
| co-operation for peace, prosperity, democracy | | | | $200 million. |
| and freedom. | | | | In spite of these measures to prevent nuclear |
| The Nature of Indo-US Relations | | | | proliferation, in 1980, the Carter administration |
| The US ‘tilt’ towards India evident | | | | found it convenient to agree to the supply of fuel |
| throughout the 1990s is not really a new | | | | for India’s Tarapur plants in violation of the |
| phenomenon, in principle since 1947, two basic | | | | NNPA in order for strengthening “ties with a |
| objectives have dominated US policy towards | | | | key South Asian country” in the wake of |
| South Asia: | | | | major foreign policy challenges to US interests in |
| 1. A mutually beneficial relationship with Pakistan. | | | | the region following the Iranian Revolution and the |
| 2. Seeking increased co-operation with India. | | | | Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. |
| Because of the initial US reluctance to get too | | | | Even though the Indian PNE provided a |
| deeply involved in the subcontinent, the region | | | | momentum to legislations in the US for halting |
| was tagged as a ‘low priority’ area in the | | | | nuclear proliferation, the US found it convenient to |
| overall US policy. Nevertheless, even within the | | | | continue cooperation with India despite its refusal |
| context of reinforcing Pakistan and establishment | | | | to sign the NPT, and later in 1996 its refusal to |
| of friendly relations with India in spite of the | | | | sign the CTBT, and finally, five overt nuclear tests |
| latter’s communist leanings and a treaty | | | | in May 1998 |
| relationship with the Soviet Union, it was felt within | | | | Several factors have emerged that call for |
| the US policy circles (e.g John Foster Dulles) that | | | | greater cooperation and US engagement of India |
| despite, “treaty alliances such as SEATO with | | | | despite its overt nuclearization: |
| Pakistan......Bharat must be given greater aid than | | | | 1. The Indian tests have confirmed what the US |
| an ally of the US because it was making genuine | | | | strategic community has always assumed: that |
| efforts to develop institutions of freedom”. | | | | India is a nuclear-capable state. |
| Such sentiments, however, did little in terms of | | | | 2. That India, like China, will continue to be |
| advancing any meaningful co-operative relationship | | | | committed to nuclear energy as one of the |
| between the two paragons of democracy. While | | | | means of alleviating its energy shortfalls. |
| the US saw India through the Hollywood | | | | This flows from the second, that given India’s |
| portrayals of the British Raj, many Indians | | | | energy shortfalls, its nuclear sector can be a large |
| including Nehru, saw US through the left-wing | | | | market for external investors |
| British lens as not only racist, but as the best field | | | | With particular reference to nuclear proliferation, |
| for the study of economic imperialism. | | | | however, four elements are considered to be of |
| Consequently, despite slogans of democracy as a | | | | utmost importance: |
| common factor, US and India remained | | | | 1. Adherence to the CTBT. |
| ‘estranged democracies’. | | | | 2. A moratorium on the further production of |
| However, the only time that the US and India did | | | | fissile material. |
| actively co-operate was during the Indian conflict | | | | 3. Demonstration of prudence and restraint in the |
| with China in 1962. Fears of the ‘awakening | | | | development, flight testing and storage of ballistic |
| giant’ opened the doors of US assistance to | | | | missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft. |
| Indian nuclear programme bringing in assistance in | | | | 4. Strengthening of export controls. |
| training, materials, and technical know-how like | | | | But even as the sixth Review Conference on NPT |
| plutonium enrichment and fabrication of a limited | | | | in April-May 2000, deplored Indian and Pakistani |
| number of plutonium fuel elements for insertion | | | | nuclear tests, there are reports that India may be |
| on a test basis in the Tarapur and/or Rajasthan | | | | contemplating its eighth nuclear test of a |
| reactors during their initial phase of operation. It | | | | hydrogen device. The report goes on to say that |
| did not last very long, overcome by mistrust, | | | | after testing the hydrogen bomb India may make |
| miscues, and mishaps. | | | | moves to be the first in the subcontinent to sign |
| . US policy makers felt that India, backed by a | | | | the CTBT in order to gain the benefits which may |
| large and improving military force and a growing | | | | accrue as a consequence of this move. |
| advanced industrial economy could no longer be | | | | The above discourse on Indo-US relations points |
| treated merely as a pawn in the world power | | | | to a basic pattern of mutually beneficial |
| strategies. It was felt that the goal of drawing | | | | co-operation despite the ebb and flows over the |
| India closer to the US would serve as model of | | | | Cold War years. One of the key factors which |
| progress for the developing countries, because | | | | brought US attention towards India was its close |
| “India is both a developing country and also an | | | | relations with the Soviet Union. The US continued |
| industrial power, (and is) in a position to promote | | | | to engage India because it did not want to lose it |
| constructive international discussion about trade, | | | | to the USSR, considered India as a potential ally |
| energy, investment, balance of payments, | | | | against China, and an important market in terms |
| technology and other questions”. | | | | of the post-Cold War environment. |
| In what became known as the Reagan Doctrine, | | | | Indo-US Strategic Co-operation: Implications for |
| the US administration emphasized improvement | | | | Pakistan |
| of relations with India even as it increased | | | | While the Cold War order gave a definite shape |
| economic and military assistance to Pakistan. | | | | to the nature of threat, there is little agreement |
| Within the ambit of this doctrine, three goals were | | | | over the shape of the emerging international |
| of paramount importance: | | | | order. The whole concept of security has |
| 1. The US desired better US-Indian ties because | | | | essentially become a contested concept. Where |
| they could help in preventing the opening of a | | | | once security thinking centred on the idea of |
| two-front confrontation for Pakistan. | | | | national security largely defined in military terms, |
| 2. Substantial improvement of US-Indian relations | | | | many contemporary security threats: globalization |
| could be used to better Indo-Pakistanties. | | | | and the prospects of realignments in the global |
| 3. American support for the expulsion of the | | | | financial and trading system effecting |
| Soviets from Afghanistan was important for | | | | monopolization, human rights, proliferation of |
| regional security and a key element of the | | | | weapons of mass destruction, drugs and |
| Reagan Doctrine. | | | | terrorism are now having an impact on the nature |
| Seen from the perspective of the above goals, | | | | of traditional alliance systems. |
| India figured as an important element of the | | | | Pakistan was significantly different in contrast to |
| American foreign policy thrust even as the | | | | that conveyed to India. Clinton’s address to |
| Soviets ravaged Afghanistan. | | | | the Pakistani nation carried a blunt warning that |
| Throughout the Reagan years, the US | | | | Pakistan needs to critically examine its place in the |
| encouraged good relations between India and | | | | region and the sort of society it wishes to build, |
| Pakistan as it was felt that both these countries | | | | and that there is a very thin line between support |
| could play an important role in maintaining peace | | | | and sympathy and total collapse as “there |
| and security in South Asia and work for a Soviet | | | | was a danger of Pakistan growing even more |
| withdrawal. The emergence of new threats in the | | | | isolated, drawing even more resources from the |
| form of a defiant China and radical Islam have | | | | need of the people. Pakistan must help create |
| brought India and US to share new opportunities | | | | conditions that will allow dialogue to succeed and |
| for co-operation. India is now considered not only | | | | pursue reconciliation for the sake of the |
| to be a potential huge ‘market’, but also | | | | future.” |
| a country that may be a willing surrogate for | | | | Given the Indian efforts to strengthen their |
| containment of these ‘new enemies’ both | | | | conventional military capabilities, the intentions of |
| within the larger Southern Asian region and the | | | | increasing their maritime boundaries, the blatant |
| Indian Ocean | | | | use of force against neighbours, and the silence of |
| Indo-US relations in the Changing Environment | | | | the international community, it would not be too |
| “The question arises whether we can distil | | | | presumptuous to suggest that India may have |
| from past international politics as viewed by some | | | | been given the nod to go ahead on its agenda of |
| of our wisest interpreters a body of common | | | | establishing itself as the South Asian policeman |
| principles or a core of residual truths”. Kenneth | | | | even if it means using force against recalcitrant |
| W. Thompson. American Approaches to | | | | neighbours. The invitation to India to attend the |
| International Politics. | | | | community of democracies meet in Warsaw in |
| . While the US no doubt remains the most | | | | July 2000, indicates that it has been accepted to |
| powerful force, this does not decrease the | | | | stand as a peer among nations who determine |
| importance of the emergence of new power | | | | the destinies of lesser states. |
| centres in the 21st century. In any of its | | | | This will only serve to increase the discord |
| international relations, three core objectives are of | | | | between India and Pakistan, which has been of |
| paramount importance to the United States: | | | | great concern to the US, as any efforts to bring |
| 1. Enhancement of its security. | | | | the two countries to a dialogue table have |
| 2. Bolstering its economic prosperity. | | | | assuredly been in favour of India. In his trip to |
| 3. Promotion of democracy abroad. | | | | South Asia, President Clinton made it clear that |
| , with the growing phenomenon of globalization, | | | | the US will not mediate between India and |
| there is now a growing competition of political, | | | | Pakistan as far as the settlement of the Kashmir |
| economic, ideological, and cultural relations in a | | | | issue is concerned. While the US has chosen to |
| gradually evolving multipolar world. In this context, | | | | castigate Pakistan for its support to the so-called |
| relations between India and US have taken a new | | | | ‘terrorists’ in Kashmir, presence of |
| turn. Where once the US had been cautious about | | | | 700,000 Indian forces has been completely |
| Indian non-alignment and its penchant for the | | | | ignored. The message is quite evident. Any |
| Soviet Union, policy circles within and outside the | | | | initiative on making ‘innovative’ |
| White House have, in current times, sought to | | | | concessions must come from Pakistan and bring |
| engage New Delhi for a more co-operative and | | | | changes in its Kashmir policy which has been a |
| stable relationship. In this regard, three | | | | source of three conflicts in South Asia, and is |
| fundamental variables form the crux of the | | | | regarded as the ‘fuse’ which may lead to |
| growing Indo-US relations: | | | | the use of nuclear weapons by the two countries. |
| 1. Defence and security considerations concerned | | | | A report known as the Livingston Proposal by |
| with the problems of the strategic balance of | | | | the Kashmir Study Group led by an American |
| power. | | | | Kashmiri, Mr. Farook Kat Wari titled “Kashmir: |
| 2. Economic relationships involving the flow of | | | | A Way Forward” which suggests three |
| economic resources which the Indian market can | | | | fundamental solutions for settling the Kashmir |
| provide. | | | | problem. The first envisages the creation of two |
| 3. Spread of nuclear weapons in the South Asian | | | | Kashmiri entities, one on each side of the line of |
| region which can create instability and may | | | | control, each with its own government, |
| precipitate local nuclear conflicts which might draw | | | | constitution, and special relationship with India, and |
| in major powers. | | | | or Pakistan. The second proposes a single |
| In spite of the fact that the US has been trying | | | | Kashmiri entity straddling the line of control with |
| to court both India and Pakistan, evidence of its | | | | its own government, constitution and special |
| approach suggests that it does not equate the | | | | relationship with both India and Pakistan. The third |
| two. The US has important but quite different | | | | envisages only one entity on the Indian side of |
| interests regarding the nature of its relations with | | | | the line of control. The proposal explores ideas |
| India and Pakistan. Numerous recent examples of | | | | and options for rationalising the line of control in |
| its preferential approach can be cited viz. mild | | | | conjunction with creating one or two |
| reactions to Indian Kargil air bombing in May 1999, | | | | reconstituted Kashmiri entities imbued with |
| use of chemical gas, increased human rights | | | | “Kashmiriyat” (the cultural traditions of |
| violations in Kashmir, a tacit acceptance of the | | | | Kashmir), and relating to the creation of free |
| Indian nuclear programme despite its stubborn | | | | trade zones and open borders initially relating |
| stand on CTBT which clearly points towards | | | | solely to the area of the new Kashmiri entity or |
| delusions of a ‘super power’, and | | | | entities, but subsequently expanded to the whole |
| co-operation on terrorism despite Indian | | | | of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, or |
| sponsored Tamil terrorism in Sri Lanka. | | | | cover an even wider region. |
| While both India and Pakistan have come under | | | | US pressures on Pakistan for democracy, the rule |
| pressure to accept the US non-proliferation | | | | of the law, and the development of its civil |
| agenda after their nuclear tests negotiations in this | | | | society, indicate that the Cold War US preference |
| regard have been particularly favourable with | | | | for its most ‘allied ally’ has come to an |
| regard to India. | | | | end. President Clinton in his report to the |
| Given the fact that US interests in South Asia are | | | | Congress and his address to the Pakistani nation |
| not vital but nevertheless important, US approach | | | | on March 26th, 2000, clearly signalled that |
| to relations with India needs to be seen in the | | | | Washington will now be dealing with India and |
| context of several factors which have figured | | | | Pakistan “in terms of their own individual |
| prominently in the attention of its policy makers | | | | merits and reflecting the full weight and range of |
| towards this region. These include: | | | | US strategic, political and economic interests in |
| 1) The danger of nuclear and missile | | | | each country”. |
| proliferation which have dominated US thinking | | | | . Many in Pakistan regard the US attitude as unfair |
| 2) Encouraging dialogue between India and | | | | and a symbol of American discrimination. On the |
| Pakistan to resolve their outstanding disputes, | | | | other hand, America has demonstrated increasing |
| particularly Kashmir | | | | understanding of India’s security concerns. |
| 3) The rise of terrorism threatening US | | | | The United States also seems to have bought the |
| interests. | | | | Indian argument that these concerns had more to |
| 4) The opportunity of benefiting from | | | | do with China than with Pakistan. As stated by |
| one of the world’s largest markets and | | | | Strobe Talbot, “we realise, that for India, the |
| growing commercial opportunities. | | | | issue of deterrence is complicated by China |
| 5) Strengthening democracy, which is | | | | factor”.the growth of Islamic fundamentalism |
| seen as advancing United States' own interests | | | | is regarded as a security threat to the US and its |
| including its security interests since democracies | | | | allies. The need to control this phenomenon has |
| are considered more likely to abide by their | | | | brought strong US pressures on Pakistan in terms |
| international commitments, more likely to be | | | | of controlling and eliminating various fundamentalist |
| stable trading partners, less likely to interfere in | | | | groups in its territory and across Afghanistan. |
| the affairs of their neighbours, and less likely to | | | | While India and the US have established a Joint |
| make war on each other. | | | | Working Group on Counter-terrorism, Pakistan has |
| While the American perceptions over the Cold | | | | been under pressure to control Islamic militants. |
| War years were built on the basis of the Soviet | | | | Both India and the United States have found a |
| threat and the nature of its relations with India, | | | | common ground for co-operation in this |
| the latter’s relatively democratic set-up, its | | | | phenomenon. |
| strategic and scientific potential combined with the | | | | A State Department report on "Patterns of Global |
| significance of the ‘big emerging market’ | | | | Terrorism, 1999" released in April 2000, states |
| have now forced American policy makers not to | | | | that Pakistan is one of the only three countries |
| treat South Asia as a whole. | | | | that maintain formal diplomatic relations with the |
| The US approach to its current phase of relations | | | | Taliban regime in Afghanistan which permitted |
| with India seem to be predicated on the fact that | | | | many known terrorists such as Osama bin Laden |
| India having ‘lost’ its Soviet patron, which | | | | to reside and operate from its territory. The US |
| is by no means a correct assumption keeping in | | | | has repeatedly asked Pakistan to end its support |
| mind the economic and military co-operation with | | | | to elements that conduct militant activities in |
| Russia, will now be more co-operative in dealing | | | | Afghanistan and Kashmir. |
| with global issues such as human rights, free | | | | Conclusion |
| trade, proliferation of weapons of mass | | | | In the post cold war period, the US and Indian |
| destruction, and might even be interested in some | | | | interests will indeed increasingly converge on the |
| kind of security arrangement against China, Iran | | | | ideological front. The Indian strategy of connecting |
| and Iraq which are seen as threatening vital | | | | with the United States on the issue of terrorism |
| American economic interests, if proper | | | | argues that it holds the first line of defence |
| inducements are offered. A permanent seat of | | | | against the threat of terrorism that emanates |
| the UNSC for India has now become a subject of | | | | from Pakistan. While the speculations arising out of |
| intense debate. | | | | Indo-US co-operation in combating terrorism that |
| Elements of Strategic Co-operation | | | | the United States will declare Pakistan a state |
| In making a case of sustained US effort to bring | | | | sponsoring terrorism seem to be misplaced, the |
| India into its fold and to prove that its | | | | implication of such statements is that Pakistan will |
| ‘tilt’ has not been a recent phenomenon, | | | | be put under pressure to help the US achieve its |
| it would be helpful to look into some of the | | | | objectives in this regard in the region. |
| elements of their co-operation immediately before | | | | The image problems, “bad behaviour” by |
| and after the Cold War. | | | | Pakistan has influenced US policy preferences and |
| 1) Military and Technological Co-operation | | | | has generated policy changes with regard to its |
| It will be pertinent to recall that during the Cold | | | | relations in South Asia indicating that the US will |
| War years India found more support in security | | | | increasingly be relying on India for ensuring regional |
| terms from the Soviet Union than the distant | | | | and international security. Even during the Cold |
| United States for four main reasons: | | | | War, the US had viewed India as being more |
| 1. The Indian governing elite saw the US as a | | | | relevant to its strategy of ‘containment’, |
| dynamic, imperialist power, actively involved in | | | | these have now been overtaken by new |
| supporting Pakistan, and bent on preventing India | | | | challenges which need to be ‘contained’ |
| from playing its due role in regional affairs and | | | | such as terrorism, narcotics, proliferation of small |
| beyond. | | | | arms, and most important of all elimination of |
| 2. Soviet conflict with China made it an ideal | | | | Islamic groups imbibed with the concept of |
| balancer to deter Chinese action against India. | | | | ’jihad’. The latter has been of grave |
| 3. The Soviet Union was a reliable source of | | | | concern to the United States. |
| military equipment and diplomatic support in | | | | Given the rivalry with China and the increasing |
| India’s contention against Pakistan over | | | | American presence in the Indian Ocean, there |
| Kashmir, and defence against China in Ladakh and | | | | seems to have been an erosion in the Indian |
| the Northeast Frontier Area (NEFA). | | | | vision of nonalignment. Over the last five decades, |
| 4. American tendency to dictate its allies was | | | | India has evolved a set of policies and strategies |
| seen as an impediment to independent foreign | | | | in order to play a dominant role in the South Asia |
| policy. | | | | and the Indian Ocean hoping to be recognised in |
| In its search of allies in South Asia, the US found | | | | that role by the great powers |
| Pakistan to be an eager ally, as India professed | | | | . In recent times, the country seeks a more |
| non-alignment and refused to join military alliances. | | | | offensively oriented strategy in order to deal with |
| But while the US preference for Pakistan pushed | | | | the complex strategic dilemmas related to internal |
| India into a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union | | | | unity and potential threats from outside. Today, |
| who became a willing partner in transfer of | | | | more than ever, all Indian geo-strategic planning |
| military equipment and technology to India, the US | | | | seeks to: prevent any of India’s smaller |
| continued to engage India on grounds that if India | | | | neighbours from recourse to foreign policy or |
| was lost to the communists “for practical | | | | solicitation of external support deemed inimical to |
| purposes all of Asia would be lost” | | | | Indian interests.. |
| With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in | | | | For all serious observers of international relations, |
| December 1979, the US felt “that the stakes | | | | it must be apparent that the strategic dynamics |
| were high, and the chance to reduce Soviet | | | | of US interests no longer see Pakistan as a stable |
| power offered an incentive for the United States | | | | partner for securing strategic interests in and |
| to improve relations with India.” In October | | | | around South Asia. Moreover, despite the Indian |
| 1981, the US-Indo defence relations took a turn | | | | litany of China being a major factor in its larger |
| towards the positive, as both countries considered | | | | security concerns, there is no longer a possibility |
| the benefits of mutual co-operation during the | | | | of a India-China dispute developing into a conflict, |
| frequent visits of American officials to the region. | | | | rather the possibility of a nuclear confrontation |
| According to Robert Wirsing, “it seemed to | | | | between Pakistan and India seems a likely |
| some observers of Washington’s developing | | | | possibility. And, with the United States now more |
| arms policy in South Asia that its role was | | | | concerned with access to economically viable |
| excessively and unnecessarily lopsided, and that a | | | | markets, the emphasis is on extracting maximum |
| meaningful effortÉmight enable Washington to | | | | mercantilian advantages rather than any serious |
| capture a share of Indian arms import trade”. | | | | concern for resolving contentious issues in the |
| In 1984, both countries signed a memorandum of | | | | region. |
| understanding (MOU) on technology transfer on | | | | While this does not mean that the US will ignore |
| assurances that such transfers would be | | | | Pakistan in any regional security arrangement, it |
| protected from leaks and would only be used for | | | | does, however, mean that it will be making |
| agreed upon purposes. However, in May 1985, it | | | | efforts to promote India as the dominant power |
| was discovered that there was no provision for | | | | in South Asia. Already, there have been efforts to |
| certain high-technology items such as computers | | | | bring India as a permanent members of the |
| that had possible end-use applications for nuclear | | | | UNSC. While India may not be willing to play the |
| projects. In a separate commodity control | | | | US surrogate, in terms of the vastly changed |
| agreement it was agreed that: | | | | international environment, it is bound to attract |
| 1. US technology was not to be used in | | | | greater attention from the United States. |
| un-safeguarded areas or facilities of India’s | | | | |