| With the passing of U.N. Security Council | | | | Iraq. The United States could opt for air strikes, |
| Resolution 1737 on December 23, the world | | | | with either limited attacks on critical facilities such |
| moved ever closer to an all-out war in the Middle | | | | as Bushehr and Natanz, or a more comprehensive |
| East. The resolution, which reaffirmed the | | | | set of strikes against many of Iran's known and |
| commitment of the United Nations to the Treaty | | | | suspected nuclear sites. Any attack, though, would |
| on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, | | | | require complete surprise, so there would |
| imposed a regime of weak sanctions against Iran | | | | probably be no indication of an impending strike or |
| for its refusal to stop the enrichment of uranium, | | | | bellicose rhetoric from Washington. |
| a critical component of any nuclear weapons | | | | An attack by the United States would incur |
| program. | | | | serious repercussions, not only within Iran, but |
| While the resolution was a largely symbolic effort | | | | also across the entire Middle East. To begin, the |
| that did little more than present a seemingly | | | | Iranian people would likely see an attack as an |
| unified Security Council response, the real effect | | | | attempt to interfere in their country's internal |
| of the measure was the removal of a major | | | | affairs, resulting in increased support for the |
| diplomatic hurdle to the use of force to stop or | | | | clerical regime and Ahmadinejad as citizens rushed |
| delay Iran's nuclear progress. | | | | to "rally around the flag." |
| There is little doubt among the world's nations | | | | Iran would no doubt promote more violence in |
| that Iran has become the greatest threat to | | | | neighboring Iraq, especially among the Shia in the |
| stability in the Middle East. In its push to become | | | | south, and could use proxy Hezbollah to launch |
| the most powerful nation in the region, Iran has | | | | attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets, |
| fomented unrest among Iraq's Shia, supported | | | | forcing an Israeli response that could prompt |
| terrorist ally Hezbollah in a brutal summer war | | | | Syrian intervention and Muslim outrage, both at |
| with Israel, and aggressively pursued a nuclear | | | | Israel's involvement and what would be perceived |
| program that it claims is for peaceful purposes, | | | | as yet another U.S. attack on Islam, throughout |
| but which the world strongly suspects is a | | | | the entire Middle East. The Russian government |
| concerted effort to acquire nuclear weapons. | | | | would be infuriated about an attack on its financial |
| In dealing with Iran, there are simply no good | | | | investment in Iran's nuclear program, and would |
| options available. Negotiations have thus far | | | | provide covert and possibly overt support for |
| yielded no progress, with Iran rejecting very | | | | Iranian actions that would create problems for the |
| attractive incentives packages from the European | | | | United States in the region as the conflict quickly |
| Union and the west, and with any additional offers | | | | spiraled out of control. Nations friendly to, or at |
| such as normalized diplomatic or economic | | | | least tolerant of the United States, would find it |
| relations likely to be rejected as well. The Iranian | | | | difficult not to alienate the United States while |
| leadership, including President Mahmoud | | | | appeasing populations supportive of their fellow |
| Ahmadinejad and chief nuclear negotiator Ari | | | | Muslims. |
| Larijani, have repeatedly stated that Iran will | | | | In the end, the consequences of a military strike |
| never give up its right to nuclear technology. | | | | against Iran probably outweigh any benefits to be |
| Sanctions, especially the ones recently imposed by | | | | gained by delaying the Islamic Republic's progress |
| the Security Council, will have a negligible effect at | | | | toward a nuclear weapon capability. The risk of a |
| best. Historically such measures have proven | | | | Middle East war means the United States and |
| ineffective, particularly when the goal is to target | | | | Europe may have no other option but to accept |
| something the sanctioned nation deems as vital or | | | | the reality that Iran will one day join the club of |
| extremely important. Russia and China, both | | | | nuclear powered nations, knowing that the |
| heavily invested in Iran, will not undertake actions | | | | massive arsenals of the west will likely prevent an |
| that will harm their financial interests, no matter | | | | Iranian first-strike against Israel or any other |
| what is expected of them under the provisions of | | | | nation. Such an act by Iran would be an invitation |
| the U.N. resolution. Unless a great majority of | | | | to the west to retaliate in a manner that would |
| other nations is willing to actively enforce a real | | | | guarantee the demise of the Iranian regime. |
| sanctions package, Iran will be unaffected by such | | | | Make no mistake about it, though. A |
| measures in its quest for nuclear weapons. | | | | nuclear-armed Iran will be emboldened in its quest |
| The futility of continued negotiations and the | | | | to become a regional, and ultimately global power, |
| minimal effectiveness of U.N. sanctions make the | | | | and will take advantage of every opportunity to |
| use of force a much more likely option. But is a | | | | challenge U.S. interests in the Middle East. Israel will |
| military strike a realistic possibility, and what are | | | | no longer be the region's sole nuclear state and will |
| the potential consequences of preemptive action? | | | | have to accept that the fundamental balance of |
| An attack against Iranian nuclear facilities would | | | | power in the Middle East has shifted. None of this |
| likely be carried out by the United States, with | | | | bodes well for a long-suffering region desperately |
| possibly an assist from our British allies. Any sort | | | | in need of peace and stability. But the reality is |
| of ground invasion involving U.S. forces is highly | | | | that of all the options facing the United States |
| improbable, with major ongoing American troop | | | | and the west, the acceptance of a nuclear-armed |
| commitments to the conflicts in Afghanistan and | | | | Iran is the one fraught with the fewest perils. |